Mimesis
The most commonly accepted English
equivalent of the Greek term Mimesis is imitation. This process of imitation
can be found in our everyday lives. If we take a look around or even into
ourselves this process can be seen vividly. Our basic characters are the
reflection of the society we lives in and this can be considered as a major
example of mimesis.
If we trace the history of literature we
can see the importance the word ‘mimesis’ had or still having in the world of
literature. The idea of mimesis in the ancient Greece was regarding the works
of art. The art was created by the artists by imitating the physical world
around them.
The term Mimesis was introduced by the
Greek philosopher Plato in his book ‘Republic’.
It is derived from the root ‘mimos’ which is a noun that designates both a
person who imitates and a specific genre of performance based on the imitation
of stereotypical character traits. For Plato art is just an illusion which
imitates something which is real, but this real happens to be a shadow of the
ideal world. Thus for him, art is an imitation of an imitation, is thrice
removed from reality. He considers mimesis as a dangerous and potentially corrupting
imitation of reality.
Plato’s use of the word ‘mimesis’ was a
sort of radical turning point during his time regarding the concept of art.
Prior to Plato the Greek culture considered the images as the real objects. For
example, the archaic statues of Gods and Goddess were considered as real since
they are invisible to the human eye. Plato redefined art as a mere appearance
rather than a real thing. He regarded the study of morals as basic and wanted
all arts to be guided by moral principles. For him imitative art has a
corrupting influence on man who should be governed by reason not passion. It is
far deviated from the norms of reason. He condemns poetic imitation on the
ground that “it fed and watered passions instead of drying them up and let them
rule instead of ruling them as they ought to be ruled, with a view to the happiness
and virtue of mankind”(Nagarajan, 7).
The books two and three of Republic gives an idea about how mimesis
affects children and adults. Here mimesis is defined as secondary and unhealthy.
It is a luxury, not a necessity. Even before he formally introduces his
definition of art, then, Plato separates mimesis from the real, the rational and
the essential, and equates it with pleasure and emotion rather than truth,
reason and the necessities of life. Telling stories to young children will
produce imitations of the good or bad actions that the story represents.
Socrates, narrator of Republic, makes
this point explicitly in book three: ‘Or haven’t you observed that imitations,
if they are practiced continually from youth onwards, become established as
habits and nature, in body and sounds and in thought?’ (Plato 74). In book
three, Socrates continues his list of prohibited stories and behaviours.
Socrates forbids stories about the torments of the underworld, any depictions
of heroes lamenting their fate, laughing uncontrollably, disobeying their
superiors or being immoderate in their desires for sex, food or money. Socrates
gives stories an important place in the education of the young, then, he
follows his initial implication that mimesis is excessive, unnatural and false.
Indeed, mimesis is an effective educator precisely because it is false. It acts
like a drug, Socrates suggests, that is useful when administered correctly, but
dangerous when given indiscriminately (Plato, 1991: 60).
The mimetic narrator is inherently a liar.
He conceals his personality behind that of his character, and thus opens up the
possibility of other deceptions. The mimetic narration violates the principle
of specialization. The imitator cannot avoid a certain contamination by the
object of imitation.
The best republic and the best life are
both governed by reason, but mimesis is contrary to reason in almost every way.
Mimesis produces mere ‘phantoms’, not real things. It is at once dependent and
deluded. The artist only does not make the ‘being’ he only reflects ‘something
that is like the being, but is not being’ (Plato, 1991: 279).
To reinforce this association of art and
‘mere’ appearance, Socrates introduces an analogy, based on his so-called
theory of forms. He asks his auditors to imagine three kinds of couches. The
first couch is ‘in nature’. This is the idea of a couch produced by a God
(Plato, 1991: 279). The second couch is material, the kind made by a craftsman.
The third couch is an imitation painted by an artist. Socrates argues that each
couch has a different relationship to reality and truth. The real maker of any
couch is the God. Along the same lines, Socrates argues, the god’s couch is
most real because it is purely conceptual. Although it is material, and thus
real in the colloquial sense, the craftsman’s couch is nevertheless at a remove
from the true reality. The craftsman looks towards the rational form of a couch
when he makes any given material couch. He crafts an approximation of the
original, gives material form to the concept in his work. The imitated couch,
in turn, is twice removed from the real one. The painter relies entirely upon
the craftsman’s couch when he or she makes an imitation. Ignorant of the God’s
couch, the painter gives us only the appearance of a material couch. Moreover,
the painter can only represent one side of the object. He or she imitates how
the couch looks from one limited perspective, not what it essentially is.
‘Therefore’, Socrates concludes, ‘imitation is surely far from the
truth…because it lays hold of a certain small part of each thing, and that part
is itself only a phantom’ (Plato, 1991: 281).
He then talks about tragedies which is in
fact the representation of emotions. Tragedy imitates human actions and brings
into light the real human emotions and reason. The actor gets divided between
his reason and emotions. It encourages the viewers to indulge in suffering.
Since it appeals to the emotions rather than to reason, tragedy has
far-reaching consequences for the audience. Just as children imitate the
stories they hear, audiences at the theatre identify closely with what they see
depicted on stage. Even the best among us are led to ‘give ourselves over to
following the imitation’, and suffering along with the hero (Plato, 1991: 289).
Thus the importance is given to emotions rather than reason. This is the major
fault with mimesis. Ultimately he wants all the poets or artists to be exiled
from his ideal city of Republic.
After Plato we can see the concept of
mimesis in Aristotle. The concept of imitation in Aristotelian logic is
different from that of Platonic. According to Plato, the world is an imperfect
reflection of the ideal world. Aristotle rejects Plato’s doctrine of ideas. For
Plato the art is a production of copy and thus for him it is trivial but for
Aristotle it is a product of creativity. For him artist is a maker and his
creations are based on human actions, his emotions and his character.
The idea of mimesis is found in his text Poetics.
It is an incomplete compilation of lecture notes on tragedy which
engages deeply in questioning the concept of imitation by Plato. For Aristotle
imitation or poetry is an art that possess its own internal laws and aims. The
poetry is a natural object that can be studied as a part or subject, that can
be classified according to the will of the readers and ultimately will be rated
by them as good or bad. It has a life other than just a mere reflection of the
world. It should be studied individually. It not only imitates the physical
forms of the nature but also the process that takes place there. He considers
art as an animate body not just as a mere imitation. According to him, good
plots ‘resemble a living organism in all its unity, and produce the pleasure
proper to it’ (Aristotle, 1951: 89).
In the beginning chapters of Poetics, Aristotle talks about the
materials used in the process of imitation. For Plato, whatever the art is,
whether it is music, tragedy, or painting it is basically same. They are just
the shadow of the real. But for Aristotle these arts forms are different from
each other on the basis of the materials used for representation. In the case
of music, the materials used are rhythm and melody, painters use figure and
colour, and on the other hand writers use rhythm, language and melody. The
artist is a craftsman on whose hands the art takes life of its own.
In the fourth chapter of Poetics Aristotle gives an account of
the two sources of the origin of poetry or imitation. First, mimesis is a
natural capacity of all human beings, “implanted in man from childhood, which
distinguishes us from animals” (Aristotle, 1951: 15). Thus the buried desire
for imitation starts with the young age. The second source of the mimesis lies
with that of adults. They find pleasure at looking on the representation of the
things that once were painful in looking at in the original state. This
representation actually distances us from the original which is the reality and
hence this distance helps us to be more rational rather than be emotional. He
gets pleased with the representation since he sees himself on the stage.
Tragedies, according to Plato are
basically irrational since they represent extreme emotions, supernatural
elements and irrational desires. But for Aristotle good tragedies which are the
representation of human actions are rational. For him, tragedy is a form of
mimesis and its medium is diction and song, its objects are plot, character and
thought and is performed rather than narrated. Aristotle begins his discussion of
tragedy with a definition:
Tragedy,
then, is an imitation of an action that is serious, complete, and of a certain
magnitude; in language embellished with each kind of artistic ornament, the
several kinds being found in separate parts of the play; in the form of action
not narrative; through pity and fear effecting the purgation of these emotions.
(1951: 23)
For him, tragedy is a complete action with
a certain magnitude. This completeness shows the life of tragedy for itself
outside the shell of reflection. This completeness is clearly stated by him.
A whole is that which has a beginning, a
middle, and an end. A beginning is that which does not itself follow anything
by causal necessity, but after which something naturally is or comes to be. An
end, on the contrary, is that which itself naturally follows some other thing,
either by necessity or as a rule, but has nothing following it. A middle is
that which follows something as some other thing follows it. (Aristotle, 1951:
31)
Thus art is completely independent and has
its own existence. For Aristotle art is governed by reason and logic. If we
take the example of tragedy itself, we can understand this fact. As already
mentioned, tragedy has a beginning, a middle and an end. The beginning of a
tragedy sets a certain motion of events, the product of such events is that of
middle and out of necessity the end occurs. This order of the events is based
on reason and logic and hence we can conclude that the reason is the foundation
of mimesis.
For Aristotle, the rationality of the art
is not only based on the order of the events but also on its magnitude.
Magnitude not only depends on the art itself but also lies in the hands of the
viewers. An art cannot become beautiful by itself; it depends upon the sense of
perception of the audience. The seat of logic for Aristotle lies with the plot.
The art in and outside follows the rule of reason. It is not just a simple
representation of the physical world but relies on representing human thoughts
and action which are mostly based on logic and reason. Even if we sometimes
represent illogical events in the art it can be avoided since human life in
reality is not completely based on logical reasoning. Sometimes they prefer
emotional thinking rather than being logical.
Another concept that Aristotle gives
importance is regarding the universality of the events. He does not believe in
the mere logical representation of the world around him but focuses on the
ability to reveal universal truths. Poets does not simply represent what is
happening or what had happened he extends his ideas also to the future, he
tries to answer the question of what may happen. Thus poetry has a position
above history, which is always based on the facts that took place in the past.
Again he speaks about the tragic effect
the tragedy have on its viewers. This tragic effect happens as an end result of
the logical order of the events, and the success of the artist lies with the
emotional effect produced by him on the audience. The true tragic pleasure
should originate not from the spectacle but from the plot. When we look into
the tragedy and its tragic effect, the most important aspect that should be
looked is the concept of catharsis. This concept of catharsis is the most important
defence of art that can be raised in the history of literary theory.
Pity and fear constitute the major
emotions that we will undergo after viewing a tragic suffering. Pity is aroused
on the basis of magnitude of suffering that a protagonist had gone through and
fear by putting ourselves in the protagonist’s shoe. A feeling of oneness will
originate in our minds, the process of identification happens. When we come out
from this shell of emotions we find ourselves transformed will feel a sense of
release and serenity. This experience of purity is termed as catharsis, a
process of purification. Thus we can see that this art of mimesis is not an
arbitrary reflection but on contrary it is natural, rational, educational and
most importantly beneficial.
Moving on from classical critics, we can
see Philip Sidney in the Renaissance using this art of imitation. For him, a
poet is the maker, and poetry is the art of representation.
‘Poesy therefore is an art of imitation,
for so Aristotle termeth it in his word mimesis, that is to say, a representing,
counterfeiting or figuring forth—to speak metaphorically, a speaking picture;
with this end to teach and delight’ (Nagarajan, 45).
These ideas of mimesis later in the modern
world had captured the attention of psychologists, anthropologists,
sociologists, and theorists of race and gender in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries. All these theorists consider mimesis as a primary aspect of life not
a secondary or derivative imitation of something else. One of the most
important psychological theorists of mimesis in the later nineteenth century
was a French sociologist, Gabriel Tarde. In his major work, The Laws of
Imitation (1890), Tarde defines imitation as a fundamental life force, one of
the three great forms of ‘universal repetition’ that organize physical,
biological and social life: ‘imitation plays a role in societies analogous to
that of heredity in organic life or to that of vibration among inorganic
bodies’ (Tarde, 1962: 11). He has a wide idea regarding imitation. For him,
everything comes under this theory of mimesis, from the use of language the
spread of influential ideas, the institution of manners and even contagious
laughter. Memory and habit are also forms of imitation where memory recalls a
mental image, much as habit repeats an action. Indeed, ‘wherever there is a
social relation between two living beings, there we have imitation’ (Tarde,
1962: xiv).
Whether we imitate willingly (following a
fashion trend) or unwillingly (contagious laughter), we experience ‘the action
at a distance of one mind upon another’ (Tarde, 1962: xiv). For Tarde, ‘nothing in
history is self-creative’ (1962: 150). No one is original or self-made. We are the
product of the society we lives in. In a family, children imitate his/her
parents or whoever they are raised by. When we come to be in contact with the
society we imbibe the world around us and will eventually lose ourselves to be
a part of the society.
Freud is a psychoanalyst who supported and
developed the idea suggested by Tarde that imitation is everywhere in human
psyche. According to him, our present is an imitation of our repressed past. He
rethinks the idea of mimesis through the notion of identification. According to
this notion, the self originates from an unconscious imitation. A kind of
self-hood or identity as we think we have is a wrong idea. We are actually an
amalgamation of different selves we see around or come across in our life. The most important
identifications are those we form as children. These identifications mostly
revolve around parents and is called as primary identification by Freud. There
is another kind of identification, transitory identification. These
identifications come and go, and generally leave the core of the self,
unchanged. We are consciously drawn to certain types of people and
unconsciously will imitate them. Again, we will imitate certain types of
dressing styles, styles of talking and whatever we are drawn to.
Introjection is a type of identification
put forward by Freud. This type of identification takes place after we lose
something or someone that are dearest to us. The ego internalizes the emotional
bond that was forced to give up and refashions itself as the thing that was
lost. Freud gives an example of a child and a kitten. A child lost its kitten
and was unhappy with its death, he declared himself as the kitten and crawled
on all fours, would not eat on table etc. This is a type of structuring
identification, which transforms the child into a kitten that was lost.
There is another type of identification by
Freud that focuses on the hysteric patients. They would identify themselves
with other patients and would ultimately succumb to the other’s disease. Freud
himself writes, in The Interpretation of
Dreams (1900), that hysterics can reproduce the symptoms of everyone around
them, and in effect ‘act all the parts in a play single-handed’ (1953–74: IV,
149). Hysteric imitates the psychological aspects more than the physical
aspects. Most of the mimetic theory deals with the imitation that is done
consciously by an artist. But, Freud on the other hand deals with the imitation
that happens unconsciously. We may imitate others, but this imitation is not of
our choice. Freud’s follower Otto Fenichel puts it this way: ‘When we make an
identification we know nothing about it and we resist any clarifying insight’
(1954: 100–1).
Later, in the twentieth century, a French
psychoanalyst, Lacan came up with an idea of identification, identification of
self. He calls this primordial identification as ‘mirror stage’. First, he drew
a paradox in what Freud had said about the development of self in a child. Freud
had said that the self originates after identification with the model we
imitate, Lacan questions it by asking, how a child knows he/she should imitate
the other’s self. Is
there some unconscious self ‘before’ the ego that knows, for example, that boys
should identify with their fathers rather than with their mothers, siblings or
stuffed animals? He answered to this question in an essay named ‘The Mirror
Stage as Formative of the Function of the I’ (1949). Before the child
identifies with its parents, it identifies with an image of itself. This
identification of the self is termed what Lacan calls as ‘mirror stage’. Lacan notes that,
between the age of six and eighteen months, human infants begin to recognize
themselves in a mirror. Unlike young chimpanzees, which lose interest in their
mirror image quickly, infants remain fascinated with the reflection and respond
to it with ‘a flutter of jubilant activity’ (Lacan, 1977: 1). Thus, according to
Lacan, children identify with themselves before they identify with their
parents.
The self originates in an image of us. It
turns to the image for autonomy, an ironically mimetic means of asserting our
independence from mimesis.
Mimesis
can be discussed on the basis of the elements used in its thematic complex.
There are basically three elements, the imitation of role models; the imagery
of theatre and acting; and the problem of realism. The imitation of role models
deals with the relationship between the original and the work, past and the
present and defines mimesis as a historical phenomenon. Along with imitating
the nature and human actions around, poet imitates the artistic forerunners and
the artistic conventions they made authoritative. This theory was termed as imitation,
was a key to literary success.
The imagery and associations of the theatre
comprise another of the central thematic elements of the theory of mimesis.
Theatre emphasizes the relationship between the work and the audience, and
defines mimesis by actions and performance. Theatre is almost same as the
gladiatorial arena. ‘The
audience is not called upon to offer help but only to feel sorrow, and the more
they are pained the more they applaud the author’ (Augustine, 1961: 56).
Realism, the third element, concerns with
the relationship between work and world, and defines mimesis by its more or less
accurate reproduction of nature. Over the time, different tools are being used
by the artists to represent the world around them, literature, photography,
paintings to name a few. The artists may or may not represent the actual
reality around them, and on the other hand readers or viewers may or may not
judge the work to be true.
Thus as far we have seen, the concept of
mimesis is explained vividly by critics from the classical age to the present
age. This process of imitation is explained in various ways throughout the
history. The foundation stone of the mimesis was laid by Plato which took a
different form in the hands of his disciple, Aristotle and it is really
exciting to see how the definition of mimesis transformed over the ages.
Bibliography
Aristotle.
Aristotle’s Theory of Poetry and Fine Art,
trans. S. H. Butcher, New York: Dover, 1951.
Plato.
Republic, trans. A. Bloom, New York:
Basic Books, 1991.
Nagarajan,
M.S. English Literary Criticism and
Theory: An Introductory History, Hyderabad: Orient Black Swan, 2006.
Abrams,
Meyer Howard, and Geoffrey Harpham. A glossary of literary terms,
New York Cengage Learning, 2011.
Potolsky,
Matthew. Mimesis, New Delhi:
Routledge, 2006.
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